

2 December 1954

MEMO FOR THE RECORD OF THE CLARK COMMITTEE

Sov. Staff (OCI)

0900-1200. The most significant point raised by Colonel Miller and General Christiansen (which they indicated they would again raise with the DD/I) was the fact that although a centralized responsibility has fallen on the DCI's shoulders (channeled to OCI) for production of current intelligence since the Bogota incident, no official authority for this responsibility has ever been delegated. Nevertheless, the implications of commission or omission are still the DCI's in this respect.

Colonel Miller raised the point that he could appreciate OCI's performance in publishing current intelligence: nevertheless, in addition to this he could not justify the corollary research and analysis performed (such as in the military and economic branches) which he claimed duplicated the efforts of our counterparts in Navy, Army, Air, and State.

Colonel Miller asked if fewer estimates and reports couldn't be produced, and still accomplish the job, rather than the current mass of hourly and daily reports being produced.

Colonel Miller and Foley pointed out (facetiously) that a great percentage of OCI's efforts were in the interest of merely beating the newspapers to the punch, and keeping the DCI away from embarrassment.

General Christiansen asked whether OCI was getting all of the information it needed, and how good the information was. He implied we were duplicating the responsibilities of allied services, sometimes better qualified, in much of our research efforts.

Both Miller and Christiansen asked repeatedly what sources provided the raw intelligence to OCI, and in what percentage. They also asked if OCI tried to guide or slant their reports in the eyes of the consumers.

Miller was especially interested in the competency of analysts to report on the Sov Bloc through area knowledge or acquired education.

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cc:

Inspector General

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